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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of firm closures associated with bankruptcies on the
employment status and wages of prime-age and older workers using Dutch
administrative data for the period 2000–2011. Applying difference-in-differences
techniques and non-parametric matching, we find adverse effects on the probability to
be in work and on wages earned in the new job, which are larger for older workers than
for prime-age workers. Within the older-age group, the effects are stronger for formerly
long-tenured workers, for older workers who lost their job in declining sectors in the
regional labour market and for workers who changed sectors. In the prime-age group,
these differences are less pronounced. Our results suggest that job- and sector-specific
factors are important for understanding the more vulnerable position of older workers
after job loss.
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1 Introduction
Displacement may pile the burden of economic adjustments on an unfortunate minor-
ity of workers. Especially for older workers, finding new employment after displacement
appears to be a challenge. The labour market position of older displaced workers is of
specific interest due to the ageing population and the ensuing policy targets to keep older
workers in the work force. This paper investigates to what extent the impact of firm
closures associated with bankruptcy differs between older and prime-age workers and
studies how long tenure in the previous job, finding work in a different industry than the
one from which they lost their previous job and the local labour market conditions in the
industry from which workers are displaced correlated with these differences.
There are several reasons for a stronger displacement effect among older work-
ers. On the demand side, older workers may be less attractive to new employers due
to a relatively high-wage costs-to-productivity ratio for older workers. This higher
ratio may be the result of deferred compensation schemes (Lazear 1981; Daniel and
Heywood 2007; Heywood et al. 2010) and of a strong bargaining position of well-
protected older workers that are well-represented by labour unions who negotiate
costly special provisions for older workers in collective bargaining schemes (De Hek
and Van Vuuren 2011). On the supply side, older workers generally have higher reser-
vation wages due to longer benefit entitlements (Van Ours and Vodopivec 2006) or
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better options to retire from the labour market (Ichino et al. 2013), sometimes with
generous early retirement schemes. In addition, many older workers embody substan-
tial firm-specific human capital, which is forgone when they are displaced (Poletaev
and Robinson 2008); sector-specific capital which is lost upon displacement if the
worker cannot find new employment in the same sector (Carrington 1993; Neal 1995);
or task-specific human capital (Gibbons and Waldman 2004) that is lost if a worker
needs to change occupation. Many older workers end up in shrinking occupations
(Autor and Dorn 2009; Bosch and ter Weel 2013), which increases the probability that
they will need to find a new job in another occupation.
Earlier research has established a substantial and persistent effect of displacement on
labour market success. Especially in the USA, researchers have been interested in this
phenomenon for decades1. They have shown a severe and permanent drop in earnings
after displacement. The European literature on displacement is more recent and focuses
more on the incidence of (un)employment instead of just on earnings or wages2. In
general, the US literature has found that losses are primarily caused by lower wages in
post-displacement jobs, whereas evidence from many European countries finds almost
no wage losses for those who re-enter employment, but find significantly lower employ-
ment probabilities instead (Hijzen et al. 2010). Differences between age groups are found
both in the USA and in Europe3. Some studies explore the relation between labour mar-
ket success after displacement and long tenure in the previous job (Hijzen et al. (2010),
Kuhn (2002)) or changing industry (Burda and Mertens (2001), Huttunen et al. (2011)),
but they do not analyse how these correlations differ between age groups.
For the Dutch case, Fouarge et al. (2010) followed individuals who were displaced in
2005 for 12months after their dismissal and found that displacement due to plant closures
led to 7% lower wages, whereas individual dismissal led to 13% lower wages. Surprisingly,
they found no additional wage effect of changing industry after dismissal. For their study,
Fouarge et al. (2010) used the same administrative data as we use in this paper. In an ear-
lier comparative study for the USA and the Netherlands, Gautier et al. (2002) found little
evidence for adverse wage effects based on survey information. Using the same survey
data, Mooi-Reci and Ganzeboom (2015) found a significant scarring effect of unemploy-
ment in general in the period 1985–2000, with a notable disparity in the unemployment
scarring by gender. All three Dutch studies have asked for further analysis on the effects
of displacement in the Netherlands to get a better grasp of its actual effects.
Our study adds a new perspective to the literature by analysing three factors that vary
within and between age groups: job tenure, working in weak labourmarkets and switching
industries. Using the difference-in-differences techniques that have been the standard in
the literature since the seminal work of Jacobsen et al. (1993), we determine the effect
of firm bankruptcies on employment participation and wages of the workers involved.
We improve on this method by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects within this
difference-in-differences approach, which allows us to determine to what extent there are
differences within age groups and analyse how these differences vary between age groups.
Our strategy is to apply a difference-in-differences approach combined with non-
parametric matchings. We use extensive administrative linked employer-employee data
for the Netherlands that include all workers, in combination with data on firm bankrupt-
cies that are drawn from an administrative source as well. We take a sample of workers
who were displaced due to firm bankruptcies in the period 2000–2009 and follow them
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up to 2011. The size of our dataset allows us to construct a control group of non-displaced
workers using non-parametric matching techniques, following Ichino et al. (2013). In
doing so, we reduce the potential bias that might result from the selection of the controls
(Hijzen et al. 2010; Huttunen et al. 2011), since the treated and controls have the exact
same observable characteristics. In total, we have nearly 19,000 treated and 50,000 con-
trols in the age-group 35–54 years old. We test for heterogeneous treatment effects by
expanding the standard difference-in-differences specification.
Our results indicate that the labour market outcomes after displacement are highly
contingent on age, especially in terms of employment probabilities. Within the older-age
group, the outcomes are related to job tenure in the former job, the local labour market
situation in the sector from which people are displaced and whether people find work in
another sector. For prime-age workers, tenure in the job before displacement makes less
of a difference for their outcomes after displacement than it does for older workers. Like-
wise, older displaced workers are more sensitive to the situation in the local labourmarket
in the industry from which they are displaced and experience stronger negative effects of
changing industries after displacement on their post-displacement wages, probably due
to industry-specific human capital that is lost upon displacement. These results suggest
that job- and sector-specific factors are important for understanding the more vulnerable
position of older workers after job loss.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how we constructed the data from
various administrative data sources, displays descriptive graphs and presents our empir-
ical strategy. Section 3 discusses the results of our analyses, and Section 4 presents
sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and empirical strategy
2.1 Data
This paper uses administrative linked employer-employee data in which all jobs of all
Dutch citizens can be followed over time from 1999 until 2011. This so-called Social
Statistical File (SSB) includes information on the exact start and end date of jobs and
the wages earned in those jobs. We merged these data with information on personal
characteristics from municipal registrations (GBA) and data on jobs involved in firm
bankruptcies in the period 2000–2009. From these data, we formed a treatment group of
workers who were involved in firm closures associated with bankruptcies at some point in
time between 2000 and 2009 and a control group of workers who were not displaced due
to firm bankruptcies within the first 12 months after the displacement date4 of the worker
they are matched to. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide more information about the selection
of treatment and control group.
Employment is defined as having positive wage information, or positive income from
self-employment, in our monthly earnings records. This implies that the individual
worked at least 1 h in the private or public sector, or as a self-employed worker, in that
month. We do not distinguish between employment as dependent employee or as self-
employed worker. Nor do we distinguish between unemployment and inactivity, because
we do not have information about the individual’s job search behaviour.
The data contain yearly information on the wages earned in a specific job. From this
information, we constructed monthly real gross wages by combining this year’s wage
information with the start and end date of the job. Many earlier studies used quarterly
Deelen et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2018) 7:3 Page 4 of 30
earnings that were sensitive to the number of weeks that a person worked during that
quarter. Finding new employment during a quarter impacted earnings in those studies,
and the displaced group was impacted by this more than the control group of non-
displacedworkers, inducing a bias. According to Topel (1990), virtually all of the short-run
recovery of annual earnings is due to an increase in weeks worked, rather than to increases
in weekly earnings. In this paper, we disentangle the employment probability from the
wages earned. In order to do so, we use monthly wages, corrected for the number of days
that a person actually worked in the specific month. This implies that our wage measure
is not sensitive to people finding new employment during the month. The wage mea-
sure that we actually use is the monthly real gross wage relative to the wage 13 months5
before the displacement, since this presentation facilitates the interpretation of the esti-
mation coefficients.We choose the 13thmonth before displacement because this is before
the common dip in the months leading up to displacement that was first established by
Jacobsen et al. (1993).
2.2 The treatment group
Our treatment group consists of workers between 35 and 54 years of age who were
involved in firm closures associated with bankruptcies at some point in time between
2000 and 2009.We include all workers who exited the firm during the year their firm went
bankrupt or during the year before6. The reason for doing so lies in the potential selec-
tivity bias that may result when workers possess private information about an impending
displacement (Burda and Mertens 2001). If the bankruptcy is anticipated, workers with
the best outside options might leave the ship before it sinks and one may end up with a
selective sample of workers. Therefore, it is common to include all workers who exited the
firm up to 1 year, and in some studies even 2 years, before bankruptcy is displaced. Taking
a wider window mitigates the problem of early leavers but increases the risk that work-
ers are included who moved for reasons other than firm closure. Dustmann and Meghir
(2005) and Eliason and Storrie (2006) tested the effect of using a 2-year time window.
According to Dustmann and Meghir (2005), the wider window led to weaker results, but
the difference is insignificant, while Eliason and Storrie find that the wider window led
to stronger results. Our dataset treats all employment separations (both dismissals and
employee-initiated separations) at firms where the court has issued a bankruptcy in year
t or year t+1 as displaced. We have empirically defined the displacement date at the time
of the separation rather than the date of the bankruptcy.
We do not restrict our sample to long-tenured workers, to workers in large firms, tomen
or to a certain sector of industry, like some other studies. Instead, we include the broad
array of workers who were hit by firm bankruptcies and estimate the differences between
these various groups of workers. The seminal work of Jacobsen et al. (1993) found strong
effects of job displacement that may to a substantial part be attributed to their focus on
long-tenured workers: it led to more negative results than one would find for the full sam-
ple of workers that were hit by mass layoffs and firm closures (Hijzen et al. 2010). We
therefore include both long- and short-tenured workers in our treatment group and later
estimate the differences in the outcomes between both groups. Other common restric-
tions on the sample of displaced workers are to exclude workers from small firms, focus
on men or on a certain sector and restrict to prime-age workers (e.g. 20–49 is a com-
mon restriction). Our sample includes men and women from all industries and all ages7
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and focuses on the differences between age groups. We choose to exclude workers older
than 55 to be certain that our results for the older-age group are not impacted by early
retirement or other ways to leave the labour market8. An alternative retirement channel
for older workers is inflow into disability insurance. However, the inflow into disability
insurance has plummeted in recent decades due to policy reforms9. Finally, we exclude
workers younger than 35 because they typically include a large share of people who are
still in education and are employed in small part-time jobs on the side.
2.3 The control group
Our control group was taken from the same dataset as the treatment group. To create
our potential control group, we selected workers who were in work during the entire
month in which the bankruptcy occurred in which a person from the treatment group
was involved. Our control group was not restricted to the people who remained employed
in the months after the treated were displaced. Hijzen et al. (2010) and Huttunen et al.
(2011) have shown that such a restriction on the control group leads to an upward bias
in the results. The only restrictions that we used when we created our potential control
group is that they were in employment the entire month during which a treated person
was displaced and that controls are not displaced due to firm bankruptcies within the
first 12 months after the displacement date of the worker they are matched to10. Besides
this restriction, both displaced and controls are subject to the same labour market risks,
such as dismissals on individuals grounds, mass layoffs and future firm closures, volun-
tary quits or job mobility. Quintin and Stevens (2005) and Huynh et al. (2017) have shown
that industry shutdown rates may negatively impact workers experiencing a layoff at con-
tinuing firms. Industry level stress flows down to firms and workers within the industry,
which may lead to controls being affected by the displacement of the treated. This may
result in an underestimation of the actual effect.
Following Ichino et al. (2013), we apply a procedure of non-parametric matching to
find matches for the displaced workers with exactly the same observed characteristics11.
Matching variables are age in years, sex, industry, education level, working hours, region
and tenure class12. For each displaced worker, a maximum of 5 exactly matching controls
was drawn from the data. In principle, a control person can serve as control for more
than one displaced person, but given the large number of potential controls relative to the
number of treated, the probability that one person appears more than once as a control is
very small.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the pre- and post-matching samples of the treated
and controls for the year 2005. Out of about 9,000 workers aged 35 to 54 displaced in 2005,
we have been able to find one or more matching controls for more than 1500 ‘treated’
workers. For these 1500 workers that were involved in a firm bankruptcy, a control group
of more than 4000 non-displaced workers was drawn from the entire population of nearly
5.5 million13. In total for all years we observe displaced workers due to firm bankrupt-
cies, we have 18,663 observations of matched treated and 49,827 observations of matched
controls between 35 and 54 years of age, leaving us with an average of 2.7 controls per
treated.
Before the matching procedure, the potential control group differed markedly from the
treatment group in terms of age, sex, sector of industry and other characteristics. After the
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Pre-matching Post-matching
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Monthly wage (euros) 2764.73 2844.40 3120.55 3743.27
(std. dev.) 1578.74 6497.72 1767.68 2787.01
Tenure (years) 6.61 9.35 6.78 7.16
(std. dev.) 6.44 7.88 5.96 5.45
Age 43.02 43.91 41.85 40.89
(std. dev.) 5.67 5.65 5.62 5.57
Education
Low .14 .09 .06 .03
Middle .66 .54 .70 .63
High .21 .37 .24 .35
Female .27 .40 .21 .15
Part-time .27 .39 .20 .15
Permanent contract .96 .97 .97 .97
Position
Director and major shareholder .04 .03 .02 .02
Temporary agency worker .03 .02 .03 .03
On-call employee .01 .01 .00 .00
Other .93 .92 .94 .96
Sector of industry
Manufacturing .25 .15 .26 .25
Wholesale and retail trade .13 .11 .09 .06
Transport and storage .08 .06 .04 .02
Accommodation and food serving .01 .02 .00 .00
Information and communication .00 .01 .00 .00
Financial institutions .12 .03 .14 .22
Consultancy, research .12 .10 .14 .15
Renting and leasing of tangible goods .05 .05 .04 .03
Public administration .00 .10 .00 .00
Education .00 .08 .01 .01
Health and social activities .04 .16 .05 .06
Culture, sport and recreation .01 .01 .00 .00
Other services .02 .01 .02 .01
Other .16 .12 .21 .20
Observations 9195 37,347,346 1553 4179
Notes: The summary statistics refer to 2005. The table only includes workers between 35 and 54 years of age. Source: Own
calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced workers
matching procedure these differences have vanished to a large extent. The sample of post-
matching controls (column 4) resembles the sample of post-matching treated in terms
of age, job positions and sectors of industry. For example, 97% of the matched treated
and controls work on a permanent contract and 3% work for a temporary work agency.
Regarding region of residence, there is no selection before or after matching (not in table).
Note that, although we applied non-parametric matching, the shares of the matched
treated and the matched controls are close but not always exactly the same. The only
reason that the shares diverge is because not all subgroups (male vs. female, part-time
vs. full-time etc.) have the same number of controls. For example, in the case of sex,
the divergence is caused by the fact that treated males are on average matched to more
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controls than treated females are. Hence, in case the shares for the matched controls are
calculated as weighted averages, thus controlling for the number of controls per treated,
the shares are equal to those for the matched treated, as do average tenure and age. Also,
regarding wages, variation in the number of controls create a divergence between post-
matching treated and controls: the relatively high wages have more controls than low
wages.Weighted by the number of controls, the divergence is much smaller (the weighted
mean wage for the matched controls is 3203 euro), but not exactly zero as we match on
wage classes. However, differences in the absolute wage levels between treated and con-
trols should not affect our estimates, as our outcome variable is the wage relative to the
wage 13 months before displacement.
Descriptive statistics in Fig. 1 indicate that the employment probabilities after firm
bankruptcies are clearly lower for older workers than for younger workers. The upper
panel of Fig. 1 shows the change in the employment probabilities (in percentage points)
over the period from 24 months before up to 72 months after the bankruptcy, relative
to 13 months before the bankruptcy, for treated and controls in the two age groups. The
employment probability in the period between 13 months before displacement up to dis-
placement is 1 by definition, since we require that workers were employed the entire year
up to displacement. Directly after firm bankruptcy, employment probabilities plummet by
about 51 and 57 percentage points, respectively, for prime-age and older displaced work-
ers. This means that close to half of those workers who lost their job in a bankruptcy were
able to make a job-to-job transition. After the recovery period, the probability to be in
employment remains about 22 percentage points below that prior to the bankruptcy for
prime-age workers and about 28 percentage points for older workers. Although the older
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Fig. 1 a–d Descriptive statistics for displaced workers and controls, by age group (month 0 = displacement).
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands. Notes: The x-axis shows the
time since displacement (0 = displacement). The y-axis shows the employment rate or the relative wage
relative to the wage 13 months before displacement
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control group reduces its employment rate more strongly, the relatively large gap between
the employment rate of the displaced and controls is persistent.
The lower panel of Fig. 1 shows the change (in percentage points) in the average wage
over the period from 24 months before up to 72 months after firm bankruptcy, relative to
the wage 13 months before displacement, for treated and controls in the two age groups.
Wage profiles of controls are clearly steeper for prime-age workers than for older work-
ers. In line with many other studies, we observe a wage dip before displacement14. The
wage dip before displacement amounts to about 1 percentage points for both prime-age
and older displaced workers. After displacement, wages of those in employment clearly
recover over the course of the first year. For older workers, a relatively large wage gap
between displaced and control groups results, which remains persistent in the longer run.
2.5 Empirical strategy
We use the difference-in-differences techniques that have been the standard in
the literature since the seminal work of Jacobsen et al. (1993). We follow the
recent literature and apply diff-in-diffs estimates to the matched sample (e.g.
Couch and Placzek (2010); Eliason and Storrie (2006); Hijzen et al. (2010); Ichino et al.
(2013)). This allows us to estimate the causal effect of job displacement15. While dis-
placement due to firm bankruptcies is probably the most exogenous type of dismissal, we
cannot exclude selection bias. Firms experiencing bankruptcies may differ from surviv-
ing firms, not only in firm characteristics but also in terms of employee characteristics.
If confounding factors indeed influence both the probability to receive treatment and the
potential outcomes of the treated, the estimated treatment effect is biased. By combining
difference-in-differences techniques with matching, we reduce the bias in the estimated
treatment effect by assuring that treated and controls have the same distributions of
observable factors. Besides non-parametric matching, propensity score matching (PSM)
is a commonly used matching method. An advantage of non-parametric matching is that
treated and controls are matched on key variables of interest. A limitation is that increas-
ing the number of matching variables to improve the similarity on observables between
treated and controls induces that more observations are excluded because no match is
available. If the excluded observations represent a specific population, this may lead to
selection bias. With PSM, the treated are matched on a single propensity score repre-
senting the probability of receiving the treatment given the observed characteristics; if
the number of potential confounding factors is large, PSM may have the advantage of
excluding a lower number of treated from the sample. However, an important drawback
of PSM is that, although matched pairs may have similar scores, they may differ in terms
of observed variables of interest, introducing a bias in the results as well. It is not certain
beforehand which method has the lowest bias. In this case, the size of the dataset allows
us to apply non-parametric matching.
We start with a specification that follows Ichino et al. (2013) and focuses on two age
groups of older versus prime-age workers. The basic model specification is
Yi,t =
d=6∑
d=−2
αdZiTiDdi,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
βdTiDdi,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
γdZiDdi,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
δdDdi,t + ηi + θt + i,t (1)
where Yi,t is the outcome of interest (employment status or wage), i is the individual
worker, t is the time measured in months, Zi is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a
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worker is aged 45–54 and 0 if a worker is aged 35–44, Ti is a dummy taking 1 if the worker
is displaced due to firm bankruptcy and Ddi,t is a dummy taking 1 for the record in which
worker i is observed at d years distance from (d=0), which is the (actual or fictional) date
of displacement. ηi is the unobserved individual fixed effect, θt captures calendar time
effects (flexibly specified as a set of dummy variables for each calendar year) and i,t is the
individual and time-specific error term. We include 8-year dummies to flexibly estimate
how the treatment effect evolves over time. Our base period is 2 years before the actual
or fictional date of displacement. The effect of displacement for older workers compared
to prime-age workers is represented by αd . To aid the interpretation, we present results
as expected values of Yi,t for a given worker.
We expand upon the standard methodology in the literature by further exploring the
treatment effects estimated with Eq. 1. We examine whether the different outcomes
of older and prime-age workers after displacement are related to, for example, their
tenure or industry by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects within the difference-
in-differences specification. For instance, older displaced workers may be more sensitive
to longer job tenure, the local labour market situation in the sector of economic activity
from which they are displaced16 or changing sectors. Note that these estimates cannot
be interpreted as treatment effects, since there is not necessarily a common trend in the
employment probabilities and wages of, for example, the long- and short-tenured work-
ers. Rather, the estimates should be interpreted as an exploration of the reason behind
the observed differences between older and prime-age workers in their labour market
situation after displacement.
3 Results
In line with the literature on job displacement, our results from the difference-in-
differences analysis on the matched sample indicate that both employment probabilities
and wages plummet upon displacement and subsequently recover in the period thereafter
(Table 2, Appendix). Although labour market outcomes of displaced workers improve
over time, they do not reach the level of the counterfactual within our period of obser-
vation, neither for older nor for prime-age workers. The negative effects of displacement
are persistent, at least up to 6 years after the firm closed down17.
Our results confirm that the effects of job displacement on employment probabili-
ties are more negative for age group 45–54 (older workers) than for age group 35–44
(prime-age workers). Panel A of Table 2 shows the employment probabilities for both
age groups from 1 year before up to 6 years after displacement. Compared to the con-
trol group, older workers (column 1) see their employment probabilities deteriorate by
28 percentage points immediately after displacement. For prime-age workers (column 2),
this is 23 percentage points. The second year after displacement, the older-age group still
has an employment rate about 18 percentage points lower than the control group, while
displaced prime-age workers have a 12 percentage point lower employment rate; these
figures decline over the remaining 4 years to 6 and 4 percentage points, respectively. The
difference in treatment effects between displaced older and prime-age workers is over 5
percentage points in the first 2 years and comes down only gradually in subsequent years.
The difference is statistically significant up to 6 years after displacement, confirming
that older workers suffer stronger and longer-lasting effects from being displaced than
prime-age workers.
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Table 2 Effects on the expected values of Yi,t for displaced older and prime-age workers and the
difference between them
Treatment effect older
(45–54)
Treatment effect
prime-age (35–44)
Difference between
older and prime-age
Panel A: employment
Year − 1 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0017)
Year 1 − 0.2814∗∗∗ − 0.2292∗∗∗ − 0.0522∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0017)
Year 2 − 0.1757∗∗∗ − 0.1229∗∗∗ − 0.0529∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0017)
Year 3 − 0.1416∗∗∗ − 0.0986∗∗∗ − 0.0430∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0019)
Year 4 − 0.1088∗∗∗ − 0.0769∗∗∗ − 0.0320∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0022)
Year 5 − 0.0733∗∗∗ − 0.0602∗∗∗ − 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0023)
Year 6 − 0.0569∗∗∗ − 0.0394∗∗∗ − 0.0176∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0028)
N 4,657,804 4,657,804 4,657,804
Panel B: relative wages
Year − 1 − 0.0335∗∗∗ − 0.0268∗∗∗ − 0.0067∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Year 1 − 0.0552∗∗∗ − 0.0423∗∗∗ − 0.0128∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Year 2 − 0.0494∗∗∗ − 0.0345∗∗∗ − 0.0149∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Year 3 − 0.0450∗∗∗ − 0.0277∗∗∗ − 0.0172∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Year 4 − 0.0409∗∗∗ − 0.0273∗∗∗ − 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Year 5 − 0.0329∗∗∗ − 0.0319∗∗∗ − 0.0011
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Year 6 − 0.0325∗∗∗ − 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0020)
N 4,100,016 4,100,016 4,100,016
Notes: Calculations on the basis of fixed effects estimates of Eq. 1. Year − 2 is the base year. Calculations for employment and
wages are based on separate regressions. Full results are presented in the Appendix. Significance levels: *10%, ** 5%, ***1%.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced workers
In terms of wages, older displaced workers are hit harder than prime-age displaced
workers as well (panel B of Table 2). We focus on the real gross monthly wage (normalised
by the level 13 months before displacement) of the treatment group compared to the con-
trol group. The year before displacement, anticipation effects are visible: wages of older
and, to a lesser extent, of prime-age workers start to drop18. The reason is most likely that
firms are typically in financial difficulty before bankruptcy is declared, leading to lower
wage growth than otherwise would be the case.
Upon displacement older workers suffer almost 6 percentage points wage loss, while
prime-age workers lose about 4 percentage points relative to the control group19. For
prime-age workers, the negative impact declines to about 3 percentage points. For older
workers, the negative impact gradually decreases to about 3 percentage points; hence, for
both age groups, a persistent significance remains up to 6 years after displacement. Older
Deelen et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2018) 7:3 Page 11 of 30
workers’ wages are hit harder during the first 4 years; in the next years, the difference is
no longer statistically significant20.
The persistent gap between age groups might be related to the characteristics of the age
groups. Due to longer job tenure, older workers may embody substantial firm-specific
human capital, which is forgone when they are displaced (Poletaev and Robinson 2008).
In addition, older workers may have built up industry-specific capital by a long work
experience in a specific industry, and this is lost upon displacement if the worker can-
not find new employment in the same industry (Carrington 1993; Neal 1995). Older
workers may be especially vulnerable to this effect, since they are more likely to end up
in shrinking occupations (Autor and Dorn 2009; Bosch and ter Weel 2013). Wages of
older, long-tenured workers may also be relatively high due to deferred compensation
schemes and because tenure-related elements in the employment protection legislation
(i.e., severance payments, notice periods, lifo-rules) may strengthen their wage bargaining
position.
Table 3 shows that older workers on average indeed have longer tenure than the prime-
age group. The difference in the share that was displaced from a declining labour market
is small, and the share of workers that changes industry after displacement does not differ
strongly between older and prime-aged workers.
But even if older workers would not have longer tenure, or were not displaced from
declining labour markets more often, they might be affected strongly by these factors.
This would for instance be the case if employers are more willing to invest in new firm- or
industry-specific capital for prime-age workers than in older workers because they have
more time to recoup their investment costs.
To provide more insight into the reasons behind the persistent gap between the age
groups, the heterogeneous treatment effect in our difference-in-differences estimation
tests to what extent job tenure and sector characteristics affect older worker’s employ-
ment probabilities and wages after displacement in comparison to prime-age workers.
From now on, we refer to this as older workers’ ‘sensitivity’ to these characteristics. More
specifically, we examine whether older workers are more sensitive to long job tenure, to
the local labour market situation in the industry from which they are displaced and to
making a transition to another industry.
Table 4 presents the effects on the expected values of Yi,t for displaced older and prime-
age workers with different characteristics. It compares workers with long and shorter
tenure (with a cut-off at 7 years)21, workers in a declining local labour market with those
in a growing local labour market and workers who find a job in a different (two-digit)
sector after displacement with those who do not22.
Older workers are impacted more severely by displacement if they had a long tenure
in their previous job. Column 1 shows that the employment probability of displaced
older workers with long tenures is especially low in the first year after displacement:
Table 3 Characteristics of older and prime-age workers in the treatment group
Older (45–54) Prime-age (35–44)
Long tenure (≥ 7 years) 0.28 0.13
Declining sectoral-regional labour market 0.65 0.64
Changing sectors 0.30 0.35
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced workers
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about 9 percentage point lower than for older displaced workers with short tenures.
This negative effect comes down gradually in the subsequent years, remaining signifi-
cant up to 3 years after displacement. For prime-age workers (column 2), the differences
between long- and short-tenured workers are much smaller in the short run, and in the
longer run, the effects become less significant. Hence, compared to prime-age work-
ers, long tenures go along with an extra reduction in employment probability of 4 to 6
percentage points for older workers. The difference in the wage effect of displacement
between long- and short-tenured workers is large. This holds for both older and prime-
age workers; the difference between the results for the two age groups is not statistically
significant.
The conditions in the labour market from which older workers are displaced partly
explains their labour market outcomes too. In accordance with the observation by
Carrington (1993), we find that older workers are more sensitive to the local sectoral
labour market from which they are displaced. If they are displaced from a declining
local labour market, older workers experience a 8.5 percentage point larger loss in their
employment probability in the the first year than if they are displaced from a stable or
growing industry. For older workers, this difference declines to 4.1 percentage points in
the third year and fades out in the longer run. The adverse impact is concentrated among
older workers, since for prime-age workers, the impact is smaller and often insignificant.
Finding a match in which older workers can use their (probably relatively obsolete) spe-
cific human capital may be a problem if the whole sector is declining. The estimated
effect of being displaced from a declining labour market on wages is about − 3 per-
centage points in the second year for both age groups; the effect remains persistent for
several years.
Our results also support the hypothesis that older workers are more sensitive to switch-
ing industries. Older displaced workers who find new employment in a different industry
than the one from which they were displaced suffer a wage loss of about 4 to 6 per-
centage points compared to those who found a job in the same industry. For prime-age
workers, these effects are about 3 percentage points and decline over time. The results
indicates that the difference between older workers and prime-age workers are large
and increase over time. In general, our results suggest that job- and sector-specific fac-
tors are important for understanding the more vulnerable position of older workers
after job loss.
4 Sensitivity analyses
We have carried out six sensitivity tests. First, we estimate our main equation separately
for men and women. Table 5 shows the results for the overall displacement effects for
older and prime-age men and women. It is clear that especially older men lose more in
terms of employment probabilities than older women. For wages, on the other hand, the
results of men and women are fairly comparable.
Second, we compare results for the period up to 2006 and the period from 2006
onwards. In 2006, Dutch labour and social security legislation changed in many respects.
Not only was there a major reform of the disability system, but also a 2-year con-
tinuation of wage payments for sick workers was introduced, the health insurance
system was changed, early retirement schemes were abolished, the maximum dura-
tion of unemployment benefits was shortened and employment protection changed.
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From 2006 onwards, there is no longer a pure last-in-first-out (lifo) rule in case of
collective dismissal, but lifo by age group. As a result, older workers are more often dis-
placed. The reforms in the unemployment benefits are most important for our research
topic. The maximum duration was shortened, and entrance to unemployment bene-
fits was relaxed in cases of displacement by mutual consent. For most unemployed
workers, this reform reduced the period of benefit entitlement, sometimes the reduc-
tion was as strong as 22 months, although it did increase the entitlement period for
some other groups by at most 2 months. Previous empirical evidence shows that this
reform increased job-finding rates, but led to a decrease in the quality of the jobs found
(De Groot and van der Klaauw 2014).
As a third sensitivity check, we have run our analyses, in the same specifications as
above, separately for people who were displaced before 2006 and those displaced there-
after. Table 6 show the results for the overall displacement effects. The results confirm that
employment probabilities of displaced workers have improved slightly after the reform,
at least in the short run. We also observe that the wage reductions are larger after the
reform. The interpretation of the long-run effects is less clear, since the Dutch labour
market was hit by the Great Recession in 2009. This means that our results likely over-
estimate the actual impact of the reform on wages and underestimate the impact on
employment23 .
Fourthly, we test the sensitivity of our results by estimating the treatment effects sep-
arately for different education levels. Table 7 shows that higher educated workers have a
slightly lower employment probability than low- and middle-educated workers. In terms
of wages, the disadvantage for older workers compared to their prime-age counterparts is
largest for higher educated workers, probably because they are prone to have accumulated
much firm-specific human capital.
Fifthly, we have repeated the baseline analysis for the absolute wage levels instead of
wages relative to the wage 13 months before displacement. Appendix: Table 9 confirms
the main result that wages of older workers are more negatively affected than those of
prime age workers.
Finally, individuals who return to the labour market later may differ from those return-
ing earlier, causing the wage effects to capture the role of sample composition and
duration dependence. Table 8 shows the wage effects conditional on the time it took to
return to employment. The effects on relative wages of displaced older and prime-age
workers for workers who found a job within 6 months are clearly smaller than for those
who found a job within 18 months. This finding illustrates that the main results for wages
are not dominated by composition effects. A possible interpretation is that individuals
who happen to receive an attractive job offer soon after displacement experience a rela-
tively low-wage loss, whereas individuals who search longer may face a weaker bargaining
position when their unemployment insurance benefits are about to end. The differences
remain persistent even after several years.
For all sensitivity checks, we also estimated the heterogeneous treatment effects in the
diff-in-diffs specification and the results are in line with those presented. In addition, we
have tested the robustness of our main results by running similar specifications as above
with different cut-off points for age, tenure and other variables24. The overall picture
arising from these tests confirms our main results: older workers labour market position
is more negatively affected by displacement than that of prime-age workers, whereas
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within age groups, those with longer tenure tend to be affected more, especially among
the older ones.
5 Conclusions
This paper analysed the effect of firm bankruptcies on the employment probabilities and
wages of the workers involved. Our results support the findings in the literature that
displaced workers experience substantial and persistent effects on employment proba-
bilities and wages. The size of these employment and wage effects are contingent on
age. Displaced older workers face worse employment prospects than displaced prime-age
workers and displaced older workers who do find a job typically experience larger wage
losses than displaced prime-age workers. This picture is clear from descriptive statis-
tics and remains after comparing the outcomes of displaced workers to a control group
of workers with the same observed characteristics, who were not involved in firm
bankruptcies.
Our result are probably a lower bound of the actual treatment effect, since a placebo test
shows that wages start to declinemore than a year before the actual job loss, while we used
the 13th month before displacement as the reference point for the wage loss. Comparing
to a point further in the past would likely lead to a smaller underestimation, but this
would imply a restriction on the treatment and control groups regarding the employment
duration before displacement. This restriction would lead to an overestimation of the
actual result, since long-tenured workers suffer stronger effects.
The results clearly show heterogeneity of the displacement effect within the group of
older workers. Older workers with job tenure shorter than 7 years have much better
prospects than those with longer tenure. High-tenured displaced older workers expe-
rience a 5 to 9 percentage point larger drop in employment probabilities and a 4 to 5
percentage point larger decline in their relative wage in the first 2 years after displace-
ment than short-tenured displaced older workers. This difference remains persistent
for wages. For prime-age workers, tenure in the job before displacement makes less
of a difference for their outcomes after displacement. In general, they have shorter
tenure as well. These results suggest that factors related to long tenures (for exam-
ple, accumulated firm-specific human capital, high wages due to deferred compensation
schemes or strong bargaining positions of well-protected older workers) are an impor-
tant explanation for the more severe consequences for older workers upon bankruptcy of
their firm.
Labour market outcomes of older workers are also related to the condition of the
local labour market in the industry from which they are displaced. Workers displaced
from industries in which the local labour market was structurally declining have worse
employment probabilities and wage prospects. In the first 2 years after displacement,
employment probabilities for older workers displaced from declining industries are
respectively 5 to 8 percentage points below those of older workers displaced from bet-
ter performing industries, whereas wages are 2 to 3 percentage points lower, which effect
persists in the long run. In general, older workers are not more often displaced from
declining industries than prime-age workers, but within the group of older workers,
the ones displaced from declining industries perform worse. In terms of employment
outcomes, prime-age workers are less sensitive to the situation in the local labour mar-
ket in the industry from which they were displaced. Our results suggest that job- and
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sector-specific factors are important for understanding the more vulnerable position of
older workers after job loss.
The latter conclusion is also supported by our finding that switching industries is related
to the wage effect of job loss. Older displaced workers who find new employment in a
different sector than the one from which they were displaced suffer wage losses that are
4 to 6 percentage points stronger than those who find work in the same industry. This
holds for prime-age workers as well, but to a lesser extent. Older workers switch to other
industries almost as often as prime-age workers, but they suffer stronger wage losses after
making this transition.
Theoretically, we can explain the more severe outcomes of older workers after displace-
ment from relatively high labour costs, which result from delayed compensation schemes,
higher wages due to the strong bargaining position of well-protected older workers or
costly special provisions for older workers in collective bargaining schemes. The wage-to-
productivity ratio of older workers might be higher due to declining productivity with age.
Also, older workers’ wages prior to displacement may be high because of firm-specific,
industry-specific or task-specific human capital, which is lost upon displacement, caus-
ing wage drops especially in case of long job tenure and when switching industries. On
the other hand, supply side arguments may play a role as well. Older workers have longer
benefit entitlements, which causes higher reservation wages, and they have more options
to retire from the labour market. Our results confirm that job tenure and switching indus-
tries are important, which supports the firm- and industry-specific capital argument. But
a substantial part of the difference between age groups remains after controlling for these
factors. This suggests that other factors may also play a role.
Endnotes
1 See for example Hamermesh (1989) and Fallick (1996) for overviews. Jacobsen et al.
(1993) were the first to use a comparison with non-displaced workers. Most recently,
several studies by Kenneth Couch add to the US literature on displaced workers (Couch
and Placzek 2010; Couch et al. 2011).
2 Important examples of European studies are Burda and Mertens (2001), Kuhn (2002),
Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Hijzen et al. (2010), Tatsiramos (2010), Huttunen et al.
(2011) and OECD (2013).
3 For example, Topel (1990) , Farber (1993), Farber (1997), Couch (1998), Jacobsen et al.
(1993), Eliason and Storrie (2006), Couch and Placzek (2010), OECD (2013), Ichino et al.
(2013)
4 In our research, we empirically define the displacement date at the time of the
separation rather than the bankruptcy.
5 The choice to condition on the wage 13 months before displacement instead of
12 months is motivated by the fact that monthly wages are derived from yearly wage data.
6Under the Dutch law, a debtor with at least two creditors who has ceased to pay can
be declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act of 1893. Bankruptcies may be filed at the
request of creditors or of the firm itself and are issued by court. Firm closures not due
to bankruptcies apply almost exclusively to small businesses; among larger businesses,
almost all firm closures are due to bankruptcies. Unlike other collective dismissals, work-
ers involved in a bankruptcy usually receive no compensation such as severance payments
or outplacement services (Van den Berge 2016).
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7 The only restriction is the fact that someone was employed the entire year before
displacement and the availability of all demographic information.
8 In 2006–2009, only 1.2% of workers aged 50–54 was retired (age 55–59: 6.2%, age
60–64: 34.5%) (http://statline.cbs.nl)
9 The inflow of workers aged 45–54 in disability arrangements has come down from
33,200 persons in 2000 to 19,000 in 2004 and 10,100 in 2006 (www.uwv.nl)
10Due to the large number of potential controls relative to the number of treated, this
restriction should not affect our estimates.
11 Eliason and Storrie (2006); Hijzen et al. (2010) and Couch and Placzek (2010) use
propensity score matching to determine the effects of job displacement.
12 Education is measured in three levels: low (up to lower secondary education), middle
(up to upper secondary education) and high (up to tertiary education). Working hours
are measured in three groups: 0 to 18 h, 18 to 36 h and 36 h or more. For region of
residence, we take the 12Dutch provinces.Wematched exactly on those with 1–5 years of
tenure, and for those with longer tenures, we matched on classes of 5 years until 30 years.
Everyone with more than 30 years of tenure was included in one class.
13 Since we only observe education for about two thirds of our sample and to test the
sensitivity of our matching procedure, we have also applied the same procedure without
education and only using wages as a proxy for education. Apart from leaving us with a
larger sample, this matching procedure produces largely similar results.
14Most other studies in the large literature regarding the earnings effects of job dis-
placement have established the sharp drop in earnings prior to job loss that was first
exhibited by Jacobsen et al. (1993). Studies that do not find a dip in the wages before dis-
placement are Couch (2001), Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) and Schoeni and Dardia
(2003). Some others (Couch and Placzek (2010) and Hildreth et al. (2007)) find upward
spikes in earnings in the year prior to separation.
15 Eichler and Lechner 2002 and Origo 2009, referring to techniques developed in
Heckman et al. (1997), give a good overview of the issues involved.
16 The structural decline in the local labour market is calculated as the moving average
of the employment per region and sector given by 	E = Et−1+Et+Et+1Et−2+Et−1+Et . We distinguish 16
sectors of industry and 12 regions (Dutch provinces).
17An implicit assumption in diff-in-diffs analyses is that there are no spillover effects
or treatment externalities. This means that it is important to assure that the share of
displaced workers is relatively low compared to the overall labour force. Unfortunately, we
do not have data on the share of all types of dismissals per region and sector. Statistics on
the inflow in unemployment benefits permunicipalitymay however give some indication.
In the first quarter of 2010, the average (weighted by the municipal labour forces) inflow
in UB as a fraction of the relevant municipal labour forces was 1.5%, whereas the variation
was limited: in 95% of the municipalities, this fraction remained below 2.2%.
18A placebo test (available upon request with the authors), with a placebo ‘treatment’
at 2.5 years before the actual displacement, shows that prior to displacement, the groups
of treated and controls are comparable. Moving further from the placebo treatment
and closer to the actual treatment, negative effects on wages are confirmed that are
statistically significant.
19 Keep in mind that the wages of displaced workers might be biased. They might be
biased upwards, because those who do find and accept a job are likely those with the
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better prospects. On the other hand, those who accept a job quickly after displacement
might be the ones with low reservation wages.
20Note that already before displacement, there is a gap between older and prime-age
displaced workers of approximately 0.5 percentage point (Appendix: Table 10).
21We have estimated the same specification with different cut-offs for tenure and the
results are in line with those presented here.
22 Since switching sectors requires having found a new job, it is impossible to estimate
the ‘effect’ for employment probabilities.
23Note that this also partly applies to the short-run estimates for those laid off in 2008.
24 The results are not reported here but are available on request.
Appendix
Full estimation results of the main specifications
Table 9 Effects on the expected values of log(wages) for displaced older and prime-age workers and
the difference between them
Treatment effect old
(45–54)
Treatment effect
prime-age (35–44)
Difference between old
and prime-age
Year 1 − 0.0740∗∗∗ − 0.0599∗∗∗ − 0.0141∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Year 2 − 0.0676∗∗∗ − 0.0497∗∗∗ − 0.0180∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Year 3 − 0.0618∗∗∗ − 0.0409∗∗∗ − 0.0209∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0014)
Year 4 − 0.0548∗∗∗ − 0.0392∗∗∗ − 0.0156∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Year 5 − 0.0459∗∗∗ − 0.0418∗∗∗ − 0.0042**
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0017)
Year 6 − 0.0432∗∗∗ − 0.0409∗∗∗ − 0.0022
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0021)
N 4,100,016 4,100,016 4,100,016
Notes: Calculations on the basis of fixed effects estimates of Eq. 1. Significance levels: *10%, **5% and ***1%. Source: Own
calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced workers
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